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feat: IssuerAuth verify at AD finalize + issuer pubkey provisioning (M2A.3)

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Expands M2A.3 from the original plan because the credential issuer pubkey
had no provisioning path. Adds INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK = 0x25 to
PersonalizationApplet, bumps CredentialStore FIELD_VERSION 2 -> 3 to add
a 64 B credentialIssuerPubKey slot + set-flag, and pivots
finalizeAccessDocument to run a one-shot CoseVerifier RFC 9052
COSE_Sign1 verify against the staged AD bytes before atomically setting
accessDocumentLen + accessDocumentFinalized + accessDocumentVerified
inside a JCSystem transaction.

PersonalizationApplet holds one CoseVerifier instance constructed at
install (the 768 B CLEAR_ON_DESELECT scratch only allocates once) plus
a 65 B EEPROM scratch for staging the uncompressed issuer pubkey.

Status word mapping:
- missing issuer pubkey at finalize -> SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED (0x6985)
- IssuerAuth signature mismatch     -> SW_DATA_INVALID            (0x6984)
- length out of range               -> SW_WRONG_DATA               (0x6A80)
On verify failure the store stays untouched -- both
accessDocumentFinalized and accessDocumentVerified remain false.

Harness side: TrustArtifacts gains credential_issuer_pub (loaded from
trust_dir/issuer.pem). The orchestrator sends INS 0x25 after the
existing key writes and before the AD chunks so the trust anchor is
staged by the time FINALIZE_AD runs.

Test vector: AD bytes + matching issuer pubkey x||y are hardcoded into
PersonalizationAppletTest from the canonical trustgen artifacts at
/home/work/aliro-trust (272 B AD against a known issuer.pem).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
michael
2026-06-17 15:30:56 -07:00
parent 3868678bf9
commit a94e2b498e
11 changed files with 376 additions and 40 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

119
applet/src/main/java/com/dangerousthings/aliro/CredentialStore.java
View File

@@ -28,6 +28,7 @@ final class CredentialStore {
static final short CRED_PRIV_KEY_LEN = 32;
static final short CRED_PUBK_LEN = 64;
static final short READER_PUBK_LEN = 64;
static final short CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN = 64;
/** Max Access Document blob size (serialized COSE_Sign1 bytes). 1 KB
* accommodates a typical Aliro Access Document with room to spare. */
@@ -35,8 +36,12 @@ final class CredentialStore {
/** Stable field order for AMD-H Element serialization. Append-only —
* never reorder or remove without bumping the package version and
* writing an explicit migration step in the new ELF's onRestore. */
static final byte FIELD_VERSION = 2;
* writing an explicit migration step in the new ELF's onRestore.
*
* <p>v3 (M2A.3): adds {@code credentialIssuerPubKey} (64 B x||y) +
* {@code credentialIssuerPubKeySet} flag for IssuerAuth verify at
* finalize. */
static final byte FIELD_VERSION = 3;
/** Publish-point read by AliroApplet/StepUpApplet via {@link #get()}.
* PersonalizationApplet owns the actual instance; this is just an alias
@@ -54,6 +59,9 @@ final class CredentialStore {
private final byte[] readerPubKey;
private boolean readerPubKeySet;
private final byte[] credentialIssuerPubKey;
private boolean credentialIssuerPubKeySet;
private final byte[] accessDocument;
private short accessDocumentLen;
private boolean accessDocumentFinalized;
@@ -65,6 +73,7 @@ final class CredentialStore {
credentialPrivKey = new byte[CRED_PRIV_KEY_LEN];
credentialPubKey = new byte[CRED_PUBK_LEN];
readerPubKey = new byte[READER_PUBK_LEN];
credentialIssuerPubKey = new byte[CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN];
accessDocument = new byte[ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN];
}
@@ -160,6 +169,30 @@ final class CredentialStore {
return (short) 32;
}
boolean hasCredentialIssuerPubKey() {
return credentialIssuerPubKeySet;
}
/** Writes the 64-byte x||y issuer public key (no 0x04 prefix). */
void setCredentialIssuerPubKey(byte[] src, short off) {
javacard.framework.Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(
src, off, credentialIssuerPubKey, (short) 0, CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN);
credentialIssuerPubKeySet = true;
}
/**
* Emits the credential issuer public key as 65-byte SEC1 uncompressed
* point (0x04 || X || Y) into {@code dst[dstOff..dstOff+65)}. This is
* the shape {@link CoseVerifier#verifyCoseSign1} expects for its issuer
* pubkey parameter.
*/
short copyCredentialIssuerPubKeyUncomp(byte[] dst, short dstOff) {
dst[dstOff] = (byte) 0x04;
javacard.framework.Util.arrayCopyNonAtomic(
credentialIssuerPubKey, (short) 0, dst, (short) (dstOff + 1), CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN);
return (short) (CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN + 1);
}
/**
* Stores an Access Document chunk at the given destination offset.
* Returns true iff the write stayed within {@link #ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN};
@@ -174,28 +207,60 @@ final class CredentialStore {
}
/**
* Marks the Access Document as provisioned with {@code totalLen} bytes
* of valid content starting at offset 0. Returns false (and does not
* mutate state) if {@code totalLen} is outside {@code [0, ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN]}.
* Finalizes the Access Document: runs the supplied {@link CoseVerifier}
* against the staged AD bytes using the stored Credential Issuer public
* key. On success, atomically sets {@code accessDocumentLen},
* {@code accessDocumentFinalized}, and {@code accessDocumentVerified}
* inside a {@link javacard.framework.JCSystem#beginTransaction} so
* partial state can never ship.
*
* <p>TODO (Step-Up impl, opt 4a): wrap this in
* {@code JCSystem.beginTransaction()} along with a one-shot IssuerAuth
* COSE_Sign1 verify against the stored Credential Issuer public key, and
* set a persistent {@code accessDocumentVerified} flag. Caching the
* verify result saves ~100 ms per Step-Up transaction at the cost of one
* extra persistent byte + the assumption that the Credential Issuer
* trust anchor is fixed for the card's lifetime (opt 4b — true for DT's
* implantable use case but document the limitation). The verify-flag
* write and the {@code accessDocumentFinalized} flip MUST land in the
* same atomic transaction so partial state can't ship an unverified
* <p>Pre-conditions enforced by the caller (PersonalizationApplet):
* <ul>
* <li>The issuer pubkey must be set ({@link #hasCredentialIssuerPubKey}) —
* callers that omit this get SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED.</li>
* </ul>
*
* <p>This is the M2A.3 expansion of opt 4a from the Step-Up plan: caching
* the verify result saves ~100 ms per Step-Up transaction. The
* verify-flag write and the {@code accessDocumentFinalized} flip land in
* the same atomic transaction so partial state can't ship an unverified
* document marked verified.
*
* @param totalLen length of staged AD bytes at {@code accessDocument[0..)}
* @param verifier IssuerAuth verifier (held as a field on
* PersonalizationApplet; never per-call constructed)
* @param scratch65 caller-supplied 65 B scratch into which this method
* writes the uncompressed issuer pubkey before handing
* it to {@code verifier.verifyCoseSign1}
* @return true iff verify succeeded AND state was atomically committed;
* false on bad length OR verify failure (state untouched).
*/
boolean finalizeAccessDocument(short totalLen) {
boolean finalizeAccessDocument(short totalLen, CoseVerifier verifier, byte[] scratch65) {
if (totalLen < 0 || totalLen > ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN) {
return false;
}
accessDocumentLen = totalLen;
accessDocumentFinalized = true;
// Load the issuer pubkey into the caller-supplied scratch as
// 0x04 || x || y (CoseVerifier needs SEC1 uncompressed).
copyCredentialIssuerPubKeyUncomp(scratch65, (short) 0);
boolean verified = verifier.verifyCoseSign1(
accessDocument, (short) 0, totalLen, scratch65, (short) 0);
if (!verified) {
return false;
}
try {
javacard.framework.JCSystem.beginTransaction();
accessDocumentLen = totalLen;
accessDocumentFinalized = true;
accessDocumentVerified = true;
javacard.framework.JCSystem.commitTransaction();
} catch (Throwable t) {
if (javacard.framework.JCSystem.getTransactionDepth() != 0) {
javacard.framework.JCSystem.abortTransaction();
}
return false;
}
return true;
}
@@ -231,12 +296,14 @@ final class CredentialStore {
sink.write(credentialPrivKeySet);
sink.write(credentialPubKeySet);
sink.write(readerPubKeySet);
sink.write(credentialIssuerPubKeySet);
sink.write(accessDocumentFinalized);
sink.write(accessDocumentVerified);
sink.write(accessDocumentLen);
sink.write(credentialPrivKey);
sink.write(credentialPubKey);
sink.write(readerPubKey);
sink.write(credentialIssuerPubKey);
sink.write(accessDocument);
}
@@ -255,6 +322,7 @@ final class CredentialStore {
s.credentialPrivKeySet = src.readBoolean();
s.credentialPubKeySet = src.readBoolean();
s.readerPubKeySet = src.readBoolean();
s.credentialIssuerPubKeySet = src.readBoolean();
s.accessDocumentFinalized = src.readBoolean();
s.accessDocumentVerified = src.readBoolean();
s.accessDocumentLen = src.readShort();
@@ -266,10 +334,23 @@ final class CredentialStore {
a = src.readByteArray();
javacard.framework.Util.arrayCopy(a, (short) 0, s.readerPubKey, (short) 0, READER_PUBK_LEN);
a = src.readByteArray();
javacard.framework.Util.arrayCopy(a, (short) 0, s.credentialIssuerPubKey, (short) 0, CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN);
a = src.readByteArray();
javacard.framework.Util.arrayCopy(a, (short) 0, s.accessDocument, (short) 0, ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN);
return s;
}
/**
* Test-only: marks the staged AD bytes as finalized without running the
* IssuerAuth verify. Used by AliroApplet tests that exercise downstream
* behavior (signaling bitmap etc.) with opaque AD bytes that aren't
* signed by a real issuer key.
*/
void markAccessDocumentFinalizedForTesting(short totalLen) {
accessDocumentLen = totalLen;
accessDocumentFinalized = true;
}
/** Test-only: returns a fresh byte[] copy of the credential private key. */
byte[] copyCredentialPrivKey() {
byte[] out = new byte[CRED_PRIV_KEY_LEN];
@@ -312,10 +393,12 @@ final class CredentialStore {
javacard.framework.Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(credentialPrivKey, (short) 0, CRED_PRIV_KEY_LEN, (byte) 0);
javacard.framework.Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(credentialPubKey, (short) 0, CRED_PUBK_LEN, (byte) 0);
javacard.framework.Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(readerPubKey, (short) 0, READER_PUBK_LEN, (byte) 0);
javacard.framework.Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(credentialIssuerPubKey, (short) 0, CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN, (byte) 0);
javacard.framework.Util.arrayFillNonAtomic(accessDocument, (short) 0, ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN, (byte) 0);
credentialPrivKeySet = false;
credentialPubKeySet = false;
readerPubKeySet = false;
credentialIssuerPubKeySet = false;
accessDocumentLen = 0;
accessDocumentFinalized = false;
accessDocumentVerified = false;

52
applet/src/main/java/com/dangerousthings/aliro/PersonalizationApplet.java
View File

@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ public class PersonalizationApplet extends Applet {
private static final byte INS_SET_READER_PUBK = (byte) 0x22;
private static final byte INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC = (byte) 0x23;
private static final byte INS_FINALIZE_ACCESS_DOC = (byte) 0x24;
private static final byte INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK = (byte) 0x25;
private static final byte INS_COMMIT = (byte) 0x2C;
/** The owning reference to the shared CredentialStore. AliroApplet and
@@ -34,8 +35,23 @@ public class PersonalizationApplet extends Applet {
* state) don't lose enrollment data. */
private final CredentialStore store;
/** One-shot IssuerAuth COSE_Sign1 verifier — constructed at install so
* the 768 B CLEAR_ON_DESELECT transient scratch is allocated once.
* Reconstructing it on every finalize would eventually exhaust the
* transient pool on real hardware. */
private final CoseVerifier issuerVerifier;
/** Persistent 65 B scratch the issuer pubkey is rebuilt into before
* every {@link CoseVerifier#verifyCoseSign1} call. Held on the applet
* instance so it survives AMD-H upgrades — we'd rather pay the 65 B
* of EEPROM than risk transient-pool exhaustion or per-finalize
* allocation. */
private final byte[] issuerPubScratch;
public PersonalizationApplet() {
this.store = CredentialStore.bootstrap();
this.issuerVerifier = new CoseVerifier();
this.issuerPubScratch = new byte[65];
}
public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) {
@@ -76,6 +92,10 @@ public class PersonalizationApplet extends Applet {
requireUnlocked(store);
setReaderPubKey(apdu, store);
return;
case INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK:
requireUnlocked(store);
setCredentialIssuerPubKey(apdu, store);
return;
case INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC:
requireUnlocked(store);
writeAccessDocChunk(apdu, store);
@@ -126,6 +146,15 @@ public class PersonalizationApplet extends Applet {
store.setReaderPubKey(buf, apdu.getOffsetCdata());
}
private void setCredentialIssuerPubKey(APDU apdu, CredentialStore store) {
short lc = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive();
if (lc != CredentialStore.CRED_ISSUER_PUBK_LEN) {
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_DATA);
}
byte[] buf = apdu.getBuffer();
store.setCredentialIssuerPubKey(buf, apdu.getOffsetCdata());
}
/**
* Writes an Access Document chunk. P1|P2 is the destination offset
* within the stored Access Document (big-endian unsigned 16-bit); the
@@ -144,19 +173,36 @@ public class PersonalizationApplet extends Applet {
}
/**
* Marks the Access Document as provisioned. P1|P2 is the total length
* (big-endian unsigned 16-bit). Lc must be 0.
* Finalizes the Access Document: triggers a one-shot IssuerAuth verify
* against the stored Credential Issuer pubkey and atomically flips
* {@code accessDocumentFinalized} + {@code accessDocumentVerified} on
* success. P1|P2 is the total length (big-endian unsigned 16-bit).
* Lc must be 0.
*
* <p>Pre-conditions: the issuer pubkey must have been set first
* (INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK = 0x25); without it we have no trust
* anchor and reject with {@code SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED}. A verify
* failure (signature didn't match) returns {@code SW_DATA_INVALID}.
*/
private void finalizeAccessDoc(APDU apdu, CredentialStore store) {
short lc = apdu.setIncomingAndReceive();
if (lc != 0) {
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_DATA);
}
if (!store.hasCredentialIssuerPubKey()) {
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED);
}
byte[] buf = apdu.getBuffer();
short totalLen = (short) (((buf[ISO7816.OFFSET_P1] & 0xFF) << 8)
| (buf[ISO7816.OFFSET_P2] & 0xFF));
if (!store.finalizeAccessDocument(totalLen)) {
// Bound-check first so the existing oversize test stays at
// SW_WRONG_DATA. Once length is valid, only IssuerAuth verify can
// fail — and that's the tamper case the brief maps to SW_DATA_INVALID.
if (totalLen < 0 || totalLen > CredentialStore.ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN) {
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_WRONG_DATA);
}
if (!store.finalizeAccessDocument(totalLen, issuerVerifier, issuerPubScratch)) {
ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_DATA_INVALID);
}
}
}

6
applet/src/test/java/com/dangerousthings/aliro/AliroAppletAuth1Test.java
View File

@@ -186,8 +186,10 @@ class AliroAppletAuth1Test {
for (int i = 0; i < ad.length; i++) ad[i] = (byte) (i ^ 0x5A);
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(
CredentialStore.get().writeAccessDocumentChunk(ad, (short) 0, (short) 0, (short) ad.length));
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(
CredentialStore.get().finalizeAccessDocument((short) ad.length));
// Bypass IssuerAuth verify — opaque random bytes here, not a real
// COSE_Sign1. The signaling bitmap path only cares about the
// finalized flag, not the verified flag.
CredentialStore.get().markAccessDocumentFinalizedForTesting((short) ad.length);
sendStandardAuth0();
ResponseAPDU r = sendValidAuth1();

12
applet/src/test/java/com/dangerousthings/aliro/CredentialStoreSerializationTest.java
View File

@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ class CredentialStoreSerializationTest {
private static final byte[] KNOWN_32_BYTES = makeRange(32, 0xA0);
private static final byte[] KNOWN_64_BYTES_B = makeRange(64, 0x80);
private static final byte[] KNOWN_64_BYTES_ISSUER = makeRange(64, 0x40);
private static byte[] makeRange(int len, int start) {
byte[] out = new byte[len];
@@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ class CredentialStoreSerializationTest {
src.setCredentialPrivKey(KNOWN_32_BYTES, (short) 0);
// Intentionally do NOT setCredentialPubKey: leave credentialPubKeySet=false.
src.setReaderPubKey(KNOWN_64_BYTES_B, (short) 0);
// Exercise the new credentialIssuerPubKey slot (M2A.3, FIELD_VERSION=3).
src.setCredentialIssuerPubKey(KNOWN_64_BYTES_ISSUER, (short) 0);
// Intentionally do NOT finalizeAccessDocument: leave accessDocumentFinalized=false
// and accessDocumentLen=0. With len=0, copyAccessDocument() returns an empty array.
src.commit();
@@ -64,6 +67,15 @@ class CredentialStoreSerializationTest {
assertArrayEquals(KNOWN_32_BYTES, restored.copyCredentialPrivKey());
assertArrayEquals(KNOWN_64_BYTES_B, restored.copyReaderPubKey());
// Issuer pubkey round-trips as 0x04 || x || y (uncompressed SEC1).
byte[] expectedIssuerUncomp = new byte[65];
expectedIssuerUncomp[0] = 0x04;
System.arraycopy(KNOWN_64_BYTES_ISSUER, 0, expectedIssuerUncomp, 1, 64);
byte[] gotIssuerUncomp = new byte[65];
restored.copyCredentialIssuerPubKeyUncomp(gotIssuerUncomp, (short) 0);
assertArrayEquals(expectedIssuerUncomp, gotIssuerUncomp);
assertTrue(restored.hasCredentialIssuerPubKey());
// The unset credential pubkey buffer should round-trip as all-zero —
// resetForTesting cleared it and we never wrote to it.
assertArrayEquals(new byte[CredentialStore.CRED_PUBK_LEN],

131
applet/src/test/java/com/dangerousthings/aliro/PersonalizationAppletTest.java
View File

@@ -25,8 +25,48 @@ class PersonalizationAppletTest {
private static final byte INS_SET_READER_PUBK = (byte) 0x22;
private static final byte INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC = (byte) 0x23;
private static final byte INS_FINALIZE_ACCESS_DOC = (byte) 0x24;
private static final byte INS_SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK = (byte) 0x25;
private static final byte INS_COMMIT = (byte) 0x2C;
/**
* Canonical Aliro Access Document COSE_Sign1 bytes (272 B) — generated
* by harness/aliro_harness.issuer.cose against the trustgen-issued
* issuer.pem. Layout is the bare 4-element COSE_Sign1 array (no wrapper);
* CoseVerifier.verifyCoseSign1 verifies these bytes verbatim against the
* uncompressed issuer pubkey below.
*
* <p>Reproducibility: dump via
* <pre>
* python - &lt;&lt;'EOF'
* from pathlib import Path
* from cryptography.hazmat.primitives import serialization
* ad = Path("/home/work/aliro-trust/access_document.bin").read_bytes()
* iss = serialization.load_pem_private_key(
* Path("/home/work/aliro-trust/issuer.pem").read_bytes(), password=None)
* pub = iss.public_key().public_bytes(
* serialization.Encoding.X962,
* serialization.PublicFormat.UncompressedPoint)
* print(ad.hex()); print(pub[1:].hex())
* EOF
* </pre>
*/
private static final byte[] AD_GOOD = hex(
"8443a10126a104488dae9624eed9280c58bca7613163312e306132675348412d3235"
+ "366133a06134a16131a401022001215820aa3115ead5d1fecca289aef3598790a6"
+ "dba23edbe9b14e6818ac683e31a5af02225820839dcc32bcd32924a942c3b9999f"
+ "6cbf46960396e69606fe4295e83a0c7787a2613567616c69726f2d616136a36131"
+ "c074323032362d30342d31395432303a32393a31365a6132c074323032362d3034"
+ "2d31395432303a32393a31365a6133c074323032372d30342d31395432303a3239"
+ "3a31365a6137f458404927c33ec9c475768b269bb4ee2a098be8d64ac43644e92c"
+ "8106d9c537d6215dc00e131e4ecf00b37ebc6ac8c26210f939d38df6f1c5b1caf6"
+ "85c365b22a3f2a");
/** Issuer pubkey x||y (64 B) corresponding to ISSUER_PEM at trustgen time.
* This is what the applet INS_SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK accepts (no 0x04 prefix). */
private static final byte[] ISSUER_PUBK_XY = hex(
"ebee35bacdfc585295da337b29b6f5e8b86d4056e22c793e4bf033e19e9ba31d"
+ "6b8679bb41a64c4f7f8a37972b6315b4fe91248527c1487caf3a6fe31f75bbc4");
private CardSimulator sim;
@BeforeEach
@@ -103,12 +143,14 @@ class PersonalizationAppletTest {
@Test
void accessDocumentChunkedWriteAndFinalizeRoundTrip() {
byte[] ad = new byte[420];
for (int i = 0; i < ad.length; i++) ad[i] = (byte) ((i * 13) ^ 0xA5);
// Uses the canonical AD_GOOD vector because finalize now triggers
// IssuerAuth verify — random bytes wouldn't verify. The shape under
// test here is still the multi-chunk write path + final length.
assertEquals(0x9000, send(INS_SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK, ISSUER_PUBK_XY).getSW());
// Two chunks: [0..200), [200..420)
byte[] ad = AD_GOOD;
byte[] chunk1 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(ad, 0, 200);
byte[] chunk2 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(ad, 200, 420);
byte[] chunk2 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(ad, 200, ad.length);
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 0, chunk1).getSW());
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 200, chunk2).getSW());
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_FINALIZE_ACCESS_DOC, ad.length, null).getSW());
@@ -131,6 +173,9 @@ class PersonalizationAppletTest {
@Test
void accessDocumentFinalizeBeyondMaxSizeFails() {
// Set issuer pubkey so the precondition check passes — we want to
// test the length bound specifically, not the missing-pubkey path.
assertEquals(0x9000, send(INS_SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK, ISSUER_PUBK_XY).getSW());
byte[] chunk = new byte[10];
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 0, chunk).getSW());
int tooBig = CredentialStore.ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN + 1;
@@ -185,6 +230,84 @@ class PersonalizationAppletTest {
"Static publish-point must alias the instance-owned store");
}
@Test
void finalizeAccessDocument_validIssuerAuth_setsVerifiedFlag() {
// Push the issuer pubkey, write the AD, then finalize with the exact
// total length. The applet should run CoseVerifier internally, see
// the signature verify, and atomically flip both the finalized and
// verified flags.
assertEquals(0x9000, send(INS_SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK, ISSUER_PUBK_XY).getSW());
// Single chunk fits in a short-form APDU (255B max) — except AD is
// 272B. Split into two chunks like the orchestrator does.
byte[] chunk1 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(AD_GOOD, 0, 200);
byte[] chunk2 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(AD_GOOD, 200, AD_GOOD.length);
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 0, chunk1).getSW());
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 200, chunk2).getSW());
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_FINALIZE_ACCESS_DOC, AD_GOOD.length, null).getSW(),
"finalize with valid IssuerAuth must succeed");
CredentialStore s = CredentialStore.get();
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(s.hasAccessDocument(),
"finalized flag must be set after successful verify");
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(s.isAccessDocumentVerified(),
"verified flag must be set after successful verify");
}
@Test
void finalizeAccessDocument_tamperedIssuerAuth_returnsErrorAndLeavesUnverified() {
assertEquals(0x9000, send(INS_SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK, ISSUER_PUBK_XY).getSW());
// Flip one byte in the payload region (around offset 30 — well
// inside the issuer-signed payload, away from outer CBOR headers).
byte[] tampered = new byte[AD_GOOD.length];
System.arraycopy(AD_GOOD, 0, tampered, 0, AD_GOOD.length);
tampered[30] ^= (byte) 0x01;
byte[] chunk1 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(tampered, 0, 200);
byte[] chunk2 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(tampered, 200, tampered.length);
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 0, chunk1).getSW());
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 200, chunk2).getSW());
// Spec says verify failure → SW_DATA_INVALID (0x6984).
assertEquals(0x6984, sendWithP1P2(INS_FINALIZE_ACCESS_DOC, tampered.length, null).getSW(),
"finalize with tampered IssuerAuth must return SW_DATA_INVALID");
CredentialStore s = CredentialStore.get();
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse(s.isAccessDocumentVerified(),
"verified flag must stay false on tamper");
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse(s.hasAccessDocument(),
"finalized flag must stay false on tamper — atomic store guards both");
}
@Test
void finalizeAccessDocument_missingIssuerPubkey_returnsConditionsNotSatisfied() {
// Skip the SET_CRED_ISSUER_PUBK step entirely. Even with a valid AD
// loaded, finalize cannot run verify without the trust anchor and
// must refuse with SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED.
byte[] chunk1 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(AD_GOOD, 0, 200);
byte[] chunk2 = java.util.Arrays.copyOfRange(AD_GOOD, 200, AD_GOOD.length);
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 0, chunk1).getSW());
assertEquals(0x9000, sendWithP1P2(INS_WRITE_ACCESS_DOC, 200, chunk2).getSW());
assertEquals(0x6985, sendWithP1P2(INS_FINALIZE_ACCESS_DOC, AD_GOOD.length, null).getSW(),
"finalize without an issuer pubkey must return SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED");
CredentialStore s = CredentialStore.get();
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse(s.hasAccessDocument());
org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertFalse(s.isAccessDocumentVerified());
}
private static byte[] hex(String s) {
s = s.replaceAll("\\s+", "");
byte[] out = new byte[s.length() / 2];
for (int i = 0; i < out.length; i++) {
out[i] = (byte) Integer.parseInt(s.substring(i * 2, i * 2 + 2), 16);
}
return out;
}
/** Reaches through jcardsim's protected runtime/applet APIs to fetch the
* installed Applet instance for a given AID. Reflection-only — this is
* test infrastructure, not production code. */