feat: IssuerAuth verify at AD finalize + issuer pubkey provisioning (M2A.3)
Expands M2A.3 from the original plan because the credential issuer pubkey had no provisioning path. Adds INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK = 0x25 to PersonalizationApplet, bumps CredentialStore FIELD_VERSION 2 -> 3 to add a 64 B credentialIssuerPubKey slot + set-flag, and pivots finalizeAccessDocument to run a one-shot CoseVerifier RFC 9052 COSE_Sign1 verify against the staged AD bytes before atomically setting accessDocumentLen + accessDocumentFinalized + accessDocumentVerified inside a JCSystem transaction. PersonalizationApplet holds one CoseVerifier instance constructed at install (the 768 B CLEAR_ON_DESELECT scratch only allocates once) plus a 65 B EEPROM scratch for staging the uncompressed issuer pubkey. Status word mapping: - missing issuer pubkey at finalize -> SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED (0x6985) - IssuerAuth signature mismatch -> SW_DATA_INVALID (0x6984) - length out of range -> SW_WRONG_DATA (0x6A80) On verify failure the store stays untouched -- both accessDocumentFinalized and accessDocumentVerified remain false. Harness side: TrustArtifacts gains credential_issuer_pub (loaded from trust_dir/issuer.pem). The orchestrator sends INS 0x25 after the existing key writes and before the AD chunks so the trust anchor is staged by the time FINALIZE_AD runs. Test vector: AD bytes + matching issuer pubkey x||y are hardcoded into PersonalizationAppletTest from the canonical trustgen artifacts at /home/work/aliro-trust (272 B AD against a known issuer.pem). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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@@ -186,8 +186,10 @@ class AliroAppletAuth1Test {
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for (int i = 0; i < ad.length; i++) ad[i] = (byte) (i ^ 0x5A);
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org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(
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CredentialStore.get().writeAccessDocumentChunk(ad, (short) 0, (short) 0, (short) ad.length));
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org.junit.jupiter.api.Assertions.assertTrue(
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CredentialStore.get().finalizeAccessDocument((short) ad.length));
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// Bypass IssuerAuth verify — opaque random bytes here, not a real
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// COSE_Sign1. The signaling bitmap path only cares about the
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// finalized flag, not the verified flag.
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CredentialStore.get().markAccessDocumentFinalizedForTesting((short) ad.length);
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sendStandardAuth0();
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ResponseAPDU r = sendValidAuth1();
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