Commit Graph

6 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
michael
d24d72e119 chore(applet): drop M1 stub comments + dead paths + naming consistency (M2F.2)
Sweep stale M1-era cruft and milestone task markers obsoleted by M2:

- StepUpApplet class Javadoc: fix stale @link target for
  finalizeAccessDocument (now takes verifier+scratch65), drop "TODO"
  prose for shipped M2A.3 verify-at-finalize, rewrite "INS_EXCHANGE stub
  was retired" past-tense note as present-tense ownership statement.
- StepUpApplet: drop "M1B / M1C" / "M2E.1" / "M2E.2" / "M2D.3+M2D.4"
  task markers from comments and method Javadocs; describe current
  behavior, not milestone provenance.
- StepUpApplet: rewrite "decrypt-and-discard" sink Javadoc — that sink
  now also stages the EXCHANGE Reader Status request plaintext.
- StepUpSession: drop "matching M1 behaviour" Javadoc trailers.
- AliroApplet bitmap comment: align with the new method name and drop
  the M1 historical aside that's now adjacent to the only behavior left.
- AliroAppletTest: rewrite "Once M1B.1 / M1C.1 land..." as present tense.
- CredentialStore.markAccessDocumentVerified() → ForTesting suffix to
  match the sibling markAccessDocumentFinalizedForTesting() and add an
  explanatory Javadoc clarifying that production callers reach the
  verified state via finalizeAccessDocument(short, CoseVerifier, byte[]).
  Two test call sites updated.

No behavior change. Tests: 147 / 0 / 3 pre-existing GCM errors. Net
diff +46/-44 = +2 LOC (the rename's explanatory Javadoc minus the cruft).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-17 17:01:12 -07:00
michael
ed316102bf fix(applet): signaling_bitmap reflects actual AD capability (M2F.1)
Replaces the hardcoded 0x0005 in Table 8-11 with a computed value:
- Bit 2 (step-up AID SELECT required) is always set — our architecture
  always uses split AID (5501 expedited + 5502 step-up) so the channel
  is always advertised, even when no AD is present.
- Bit 0 (AD retrievable) is set only when hasAccessDocument() AND
  isAccessDocumentVerified() — we don't advertise a capability we
  can't deliver. The "finalized but not verified" branch is defensive
  (post-M2A.3 finalize requires verify) but matches the contract.

Tests in AliroAppletAuth1Test:
- auth1_bitmap_adNotProvisioned_returns0x0004 (replaces the old
  "all-zero" expectation — bit 2 is now always on)
- auth1_bitmap_adProvisionedButNotVerified_returns0x0004 (new;
  uses markAccessDocumentFinalizedForTesting without
  markAccessDocumentVerified)
- auth1_bitmap_adProvisionedAndVerified_returns0x0005 (the previous
  M2A.3 case, now correctly gated on the verified flag)

Tests run: 147, Failures: 0, Errors: 3 (pre-existing GCM only).
2026-06-17 16:54:45 -07:00
michael
a94e2b498e feat: IssuerAuth verify at AD finalize + issuer pubkey provisioning (M2A.3)
Expands M2A.3 from the original plan because the credential issuer pubkey
had no provisioning path. Adds INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK = 0x25 to
PersonalizationApplet, bumps CredentialStore FIELD_VERSION 2 -> 3 to add
a 64 B credentialIssuerPubKey slot + set-flag, and pivots
finalizeAccessDocument to run a one-shot CoseVerifier RFC 9052
COSE_Sign1 verify against the staged AD bytes before atomically setting
accessDocumentLen + accessDocumentFinalized + accessDocumentVerified
inside a JCSystem transaction.

PersonalizationApplet holds one CoseVerifier instance constructed at
install (the 768 B CLEAR_ON_DESELECT scratch only allocates once) plus
a 65 B EEPROM scratch for staging the uncompressed issuer pubkey.

Status word mapping:
- missing issuer pubkey at finalize -> SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED (0x6985)
- IssuerAuth signature mismatch     -> SW_DATA_INVALID            (0x6984)
- length out of range               -> SW_WRONG_DATA               (0x6A80)
On verify failure the store stays untouched -- both
accessDocumentFinalized and accessDocumentVerified remain false.

Harness side: TrustArtifacts gains credential_issuer_pub (loaded from
trust_dir/issuer.pem). The orchestrator sends INS 0x25 after the
existing key writes and before the AD chunks so the trust anchor is
staged by the time FINALIZE_AD runs.

Test vector: AD bytes + matching issuer pubkey x||y are hardcoded into
PersonalizationAppletTest from the canonical trustgen artifacts at
/home/work/aliro-trust (272 B AD against a known issuer.pem).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-17 16:04:05 -07:00
michael
f94e416c99 fix: AUTH1 crypto interop with stock X-CUBE-ALIRO + EXCHANGE compat stub
Three independent spec-misreads found via Path X investigation against
the X-CUBE-ALIRO vendor library, all causing
ACWG_Error_Crypto_EncryptDecrypt on the vendor's processAUTH1ResponsePayload.
Each was symmetric between this applet and our PC/SC reader, so
aliro-bench-test passed against our own host-side reader but failed
against any spec-compliant third-party reader. Path X also surfaced
an X-CUBE-ALIRO-specific compat shim (bitmap + EXCHANGE stub) which is
documented to be retired by the Step-Up Milestone 1 work.

1. salt_volatile dropped x(credential_long_term_pub) at the end.
   §8.3.1.13 salt_volatile ends at the 0xA5 proprietary information TLV;
   the credential key belongs in `info` (and even there it's the
   EPHEMERAL one, which buildInfo already does correctly).

2. Kdh now uses X9.63 KDF per §8.3.1.4 instead of HKDF.
   The §8.3.1.4 closing note ("actual key derivation is performed using
   §8.3.1.5") refers to subsequent session-key derivation from Kdh
   (§8.3.1.13 -> §8.3.1.5 HKDF), NOT a substitution for Kdh itself.
   For 32-byte output X9.63 KDF reduces to:
     Kdh = SHA-256(ZAB || 0x00000001 || transaction_identifier)
   Added a native SHA-256 instance to AliroCrypto for this one-shot.

3. salt_volatile flag uses AUTH1's command_parameters, not AUTH0's.
   §8.3.1.13 says "command_parameters || authentication_policy from the
   command data field". When §8.3.1.13 runs (after AUTH1), the active
   request is AUTH1; authentication_policy only exists in AUTH0 so it's
   still pulled from saved AUTH0 state, but command_parameters is the
   AUTH1 value (typically 0x01 = "request credential_PubK in response").

4. signaling_bitmap kept at 0x0005 when AD provisioned + INS_EXCHANGE
   stub on AliroApplet returns 9000 with empty payload. Empirically the
   X-CUBE-ALIRO vendor library errors on bitmap=0x0000 even though the
   spec allows it (separate vendor quirk worth filing); EXCHANGE stub
   exists because the firmware unconditionally sends 0xC9 post-AUTH1
   for the Reader Status sub-event report. Both shims are documented to
   be retired in Step-Up Milestone 1 -- StepUpApplet will handle 0xC9
   on its own AID (ACCE5502) per §10.2.1 after the spec-mandated
   step-up AID SELECT.

PC/SC bench-test still passes: AUTH1=9000, ~3.2 s, bitmap=0x0005.
Nucleo X-CUBE-ALIRO firmware now reports retval=ACWG_OK on
processAUTH1ResponsePayload (confirmed against j3r452 UID
04565E4A0B2190 in /tmp/nucleo-three-fixes.log). The remaining
"DOOR OPERATION FAILED" on Nucleo is downstream Step-Up not being
implemented yet -- StepUpApplet is still the scaffold and returns
6D00/6E00 to ENVELOPE / EXCHANGE. That's Milestone 1 work.

80/80 Java tests + 126/126 Python tests pass.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 10:18:42 -07:00
michael
1f54a690d0 refactor: own CredentialStore from PersonalizationApplet instance
Prepares for AMD-H by moving the singleton's anchor off a static field
onto the PersonalizationApplet instance. The static INSTANCE remains
solely as an in-package publish-point so AliroApplet/StepUpApplet keep
working unchanged.

Adds CredentialStore.bootstrap() (called from PersonalizationApplet's
constructor) and CredentialStore.republish() (reserved for the upcoming
onRestore hook). Drops the lazy-init path in get() — every install path
now goes through PersonalizationApplet first, so INSTANCE is always set
by the time AliroApplet looks it up. Test setUps that previously called
CredentialStore.get().resetForTesting() before the applet was installed
are reordered or dropped: each test now gets a fresh store via the
constructor's bootstrap() call.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-25 20:20:22 -07:00
782074f6ae Initial snapshot: Aliro applet, harness, Nucleo NFC10A1 reader port
Three components, all bench-validated to varying depths:

- applet/: CSA Aliro v1.0 Java Card applet for J3R180. AUTH0 + AUTH1
  expedited-standard flow end-to-end green via PC/SC bench reader
  (aliro-bench-test). Userland AES-256-GCM and HMAC-SHA-256 layered
  on top of J3R180's primitives because the card lacks both natively.
  P-256 curve params seeded explicitly per J3R180's quirk.

- harness/: Python orchestrator (aliro-trustgen, aliro-personalize,
  aliro-bench-test) for trust-bundle generation, card personalization
  via PersonalizationApplet, and PC/SC AUTH0+AUTH1 transactions. 126
  pytest cases passing.

- reader/STM32CubeExpansion_ALIRO_V1_0_0/: ST X-CUBE-ALIRO V1.0.0
  with our NFC10A1 port (NUCLEO-U545RE-Q + X-NUCLEO-NFC10A1, ST25R200
  shared with NFC09A1). nfc10-only/ project, NFC10A1 BSP shim,
  ALIRO_TRUST_OVERRIDE include into vendor's provisioning.c, and an
  ALIRO_APDU_TRACE wrapper around demoTransceiveBlocking. Boots,
  detects the J3R180, completes SELECT + AUTH0; AUTH1 currently fails
  with RFAL ERR_PROTO (0xB) — under investigation, see
  docs/plans/2026-04-20-nucleo-nfc10a1-port.md and bench-notes/.

Excluded: x-cube-aliro.zip vendor archive, harness/.venv, build dirs,
generated aliro_trust.h (contains private reader scalar), all PEMs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-02 10:17:46 -07:00