Updates the --step-up expected-output block to the actual STEP-UP M2 OK
line emitted on 2026-06-12 verdict, and pins the verified card UID +
log path. Memory step_up_implementation_notes.md filled in the 3 TODO
markers (M2E + M2F + M2G.2 verdict) and added a J3R452 transient pool
budget table (~2,835 / 3,120 B used post-M2G.2).
Adds the `aliro-bench-test --step-up` verification sub-section to
applet/INSTALL.md under "Validate after personalization" — explains
what the M2 path checks (SELECT-STEPUP / EXCHANGE / ENVELOPE / GET
RESPONSE / AD round-trip), what success looks like, and the three
common failure modes.
Also writes the user's auto-memory `step_up_implementation_notes.md`
(persisted outside this repo at
~/.claude/projects/.../memory/step_up_implementation_notes.md) with
the final form of the four Step-Up optimizations, spec citations, and
codebase pointers — so the operator can look up "how did Step-Up end
up" without re-reading the v2 plan. Three TODO markers left for the
M2H.1 final commit to update once M2E + M2F land.
DRAFT — final M2H.1 commit happens after M2G.2 verdict + M2E + M2F.
Expands M2A.3 from the original plan because the credential issuer pubkey
had no provisioning path. Adds INS_SET_CREDENTIAL_ISSUER_PUBK = 0x25 to
PersonalizationApplet, bumps CredentialStore FIELD_VERSION 2 -> 3 to add
a 64 B credentialIssuerPubKey slot + set-flag, and pivots
finalizeAccessDocument to run a one-shot CoseVerifier RFC 9052
COSE_Sign1 verify against the staged AD bytes before atomically setting
accessDocumentLen + accessDocumentFinalized + accessDocumentVerified
inside a JCSystem transaction.
PersonalizationApplet holds one CoseVerifier instance constructed at
install (the 768 B CLEAR_ON_DESELECT scratch only allocates once) plus
a 65 B EEPROM scratch for staging the uncompressed issuer pubkey.
Status word mapping:
- missing issuer pubkey at finalize -> SW_CONDITIONS_NOT_SATISFIED (0x6985)
- IssuerAuth signature mismatch -> SW_DATA_INVALID (0x6984)
- length out of range -> SW_WRONG_DATA (0x6A80)
On verify failure the store stays untouched -- both
accessDocumentFinalized and accessDocumentVerified remain false.
Harness side: TrustArtifacts gains credential_issuer_pub (loaded from
trust_dir/issuer.pem). The orchestrator sends INS 0x25 after the
existing key writes and before the AD chunks so the trust anchor is
staged by the time FINALIZE_AD runs.
Test vector: AD bytes + matching issuer pubkey x||y are hardcoded into
PersonalizationAppletTest from the canonical trustgen artifacts at
/home/work/aliro-trust (272 B AD against a known issuer.pem).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Adds a PC/SC verification path for Step-Up Milestone 1 so M1 can be
validated against a personalized card without depending on Nucleo /
X-CUBE-ALIRO bring-up. Verdict run on J3R452 04555A4A0B2190 with M1
CAP installed: AUTH1 OK (3.4s), EXCHANGE 0xC9 OK, ENVELOPE 0xC3 OK
with response decrypting under StepUpSKDevice to the spec 0xA0 ack.
- crypto.py: derive_step_up_session_keys (HKDF parity with
AliroCrypto.deriveStepUpSessionKeys)
- transaction.py: expose step_up_sk on TransactionResult
- step_up.py: verify_step_up_m1 -- SELECT 5502 + GCM-encrypted
C9/C3 round-trip, IVs per StepUpApplet (0x00*8 || counter
reader-side; 0x00*7 || 0x01 || counter device-side)
- cli.py: --step-up flag on aliro-bench-test
- tests: stdlib-RFC-5869 cross-check on the new KDF (122/122 green)
- INSTALL.md: fix multi-place PKG AID typo (missing 02 version byte),
document partial-install recovery, document package-static
credential store (aliro-personalize success !=> 5501/5502 installed)
Code review of 750f570 flagged three Important issues:
- Stale 'Output: target/aliro-applet.cap' comment in pom.xml antrun
plugin block.
- applet/INSTALL.md referenced the old single-CAP filename in three
places, breaking the documented gp.jar --load command.
- No safeguard or hint that -Pj3r180 and -Pj3r452 are mutually exclusive.
Updates the comments and the INSTALL.md filenames to point at
aliro-applet-j3r180.cap as the default. Adds mutual-exclusion notes
to both profile blocks.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Three components, all bench-validated to varying depths:
- applet/: CSA Aliro v1.0 Java Card applet for J3R180. AUTH0 + AUTH1
expedited-standard flow end-to-end green via PC/SC bench reader
(aliro-bench-test). Userland AES-256-GCM and HMAC-SHA-256 layered
on top of J3R180's primitives because the card lacks both natively.
P-256 curve params seeded explicitly per J3R180's quirk.
- harness/: Python orchestrator (aliro-trustgen, aliro-personalize,
aliro-bench-test) for trust-bundle generation, card personalization
via PersonalizationApplet, and PC/SC AUTH0+AUTH1 transactions. 126
pytest cases passing.
- reader/STM32CubeExpansion_ALIRO_V1_0_0/: ST X-CUBE-ALIRO V1.0.0
with our NFC10A1 port (NUCLEO-U545RE-Q + X-NUCLEO-NFC10A1, ST25R200
shared with NFC09A1). nfc10-only/ project, NFC10A1 BSP shim,
ALIRO_TRUST_OVERRIDE include into vendor's provisioning.c, and an
ALIRO_APDU_TRACE wrapper around demoTransceiveBlocking. Boots,
detects the J3R180, completes SELECT + AUTH0; AUTH1 currently fails
with RFAL ERR_PROTO (0xB) — under investigation, see
docs/plans/2026-04-20-nucleo-nfc10a1-port.md and bench-notes/.
Excluded: x-cube-aliro.zip vendor archive, harness/.venv, build dirs,
generated aliro_trust.h (contains private reader scalar), all PEMs.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
