Dangerous Things
782074f6ae
Three components, all bench-validated to varying depths: - applet/: CSA Aliro v1.0 Java Card applet for J3R180. AUTH0 + AUTH1 expedited-standard flow end-to-end green via PC/SC bench reader (aliro-bench-test). Userland AES-256-GCM and HMAC-SHA-256 layered on top of J3R180's primitives because the card lacks both natively. P-256 curve params seeded explicitly per J3R180's quirk. - harness/: Python orchestrator (aliro-trustgen, aliro-personalize, aliro-bench-test) for trust-bundle generation, card personalization via PersonalizationApplet, and PC/SC AUTH0+AUTH1 transactions. 126 pytest cases passing. - reader/STM32CubeExpansion_ALIRO_V1_0_0/: ST X-CUBE-ALIRO V1.0.0 with our NFC10A1 port (NUCLEO-U545RE-Q + X-NUCLEO-NFC10A1, ST25R200 shared with NFC09A1). nfc10-only/ project, NFC10A1 BSP shim, ALIRO_TRUST_OVERRIDE include into vendor's provisioning.c, and an ALIRO_APDU_TRACE wrapper around demoTransceiveBlocking. Boots, detects the J3R180, completes SELECT + AUTH0; AUTH1 currently fails with RFAL ERR_PROTO (0xB) — under investigation, see docs/plans/2026-04-20-nucleo-nfc10a1-port.md and bench-notes/. Excluded: x-cube-aliro.zip vendor archive, harness/.venv, build dirs, generated aliro_trust.h (contains private reader scalar), all PEMs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
73 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
73 lines
2.8 KiB
Python
import pytest
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from aliro_harness.reader.auth0 import build_auth0_apdu, build_auth0_data
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def test_auth0_data_field_carries_six_mandatory_tlvs_in_spec_order():
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reader_ephem_uncomp = bytes([0x04]) + b"\x11" * 32 + b"\x22" * 32
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data = build_auth0_data(
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reader_ephem_pub_uncompressed=reader_ephem_uncomp,
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reader_group_id=b"\xaa" * 16,
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reader_group_sub_id=b"\xbb" * 16,
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transaction_id=b"\xcc" * 16,
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command_parameters=0x00,
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authentication_policy=0x00,
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)
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assert data[0:3] == bytes([0x41, 0x01, 0x00]) # command_parameters
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assert data[3:6] == bytes([0x42, 0x01, 0x00]) # authentication_policy
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assert data[6:10] == bytes([0x5C, 0x02, 0x01, 0x00]) # protocol_version
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assert data[10:12] == bytes([0x87, 0x41]) # reader_ePubK header (65B)
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assert data[12:77] == reader_ephem_uncomp
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assert data[77:79] == bytes([0x4C, 0x10]) # transaction_id header
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assert data[79:95] == b"\xcc" * 16
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assert data[95:97] == bytes([0x4D, 0x20]) # reader_identifier (32B = group||sub)
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assert data[97:113] == b"\xaa" * 16
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assert data[113:129] == b"\xbb" * 16
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assert len(data) == 129
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def test_build_auth0_apdu_wraps_data_in_short_form():
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apdu = build_auth0_apdu(b"\x41\x01\x00")
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assert apdu == bytes([0x80, 0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x03, 0x41, 0x01, 0x00])
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def test_reader_ephem_must_be_uncompressed():
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="65B uncompressed"):
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build_auth0_data(
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reader_ephem_pub_uncompressed=b"\x02" + b"\x11" * 32, # compressed
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reader_group_id=b"\xaa" * 16,
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reader_group_sub_id=b"\xbb" * 16,
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transaction_id=b"\xcc" * 16,
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)
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def test_wrong_group_id_length_rejected():
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must each be 16B"):
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build_auth0_data(
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reader_ephem_pub_uncompressed=bytes([0x04]) + b"\x11" * 32 + b"\x22" * 32,
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reader_group_id=b"\xaa" * 15,
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reader_group_sub_id=b"\xbb" * 16,
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transaction_id=b"\xcc" * 16,
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)
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def test_wrong_transaction_id_length_rejected():
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with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="must be 16B"):
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build_auth0_data(
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reader_ephem_pub_uncompressed=bytes([0x04]) + b"\x11" * 32 + b"\x22" * 32,
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reader_group_id=b"\xaa" * 16,
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reader_group_sub_id=b"\xbb" * 16,
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transaction_id=b"\xcc" * 17,
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)
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def test_command_parameters_bit_zero_set_emits_0x01_byte():
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data = build_auth0_data(
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reader_ephem_pub_uncompressed=bytes([0x04]) + b"\x11" * 32 + b"\x22" * 32,
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reader_group_id=b"\xaa" * 16,
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reader_group_sub_id=b"\xbb" * 16,
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transaction_id=b"\xcc" * 16,
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command_parameters=0x01,
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)
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assert data[0:3] == bytes([0x41, 0x01, 0x01])
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