Dangerous Things
782074f6ae
Three components, all bench-validated to varying depths: - applet/: CSA Aliro v1.0 Java Card applet for J3R180. AUTH0 + AUTH1 expedited-standard flow end-to-end green via PC/SC bench reader (aliro-bench-test). Userland AES-256-GCM and HMAC-SHA-256 layered on top of J3R180's primitives because the card lacks both natively. P-256 curve params seeded explicitly per J3R180's quirk. - harness/: Python orchestrator (aliro-trustgen, aliro-personalize, aliro-bench-test) for trust-bundle generation, card personalization via PersonalizationApplet, and PC/SC AUTH0+AUTH1 transactions. 126 pytest cases passing. - reader/STM32CubeExpansion_ALIRO_V1_0_0/: ST X-CUBE-ALIRO V1.0.0 with our NFC10A1 port (NUCLEO-U545RE-Q + X-NUCLEO-NFC10A1, ST25R200 shared with NFC09A1). nfc10-only/ project, NFC10A1 BSP shim, ALIRO_TRUST_OVERRIDE include into vendor's provisioning.c, and an ALIRO_APDU_TRACE wrapper around demoTransceiveBlocking. Boots, detects the J3R180, completes SELECT + AUTH0; AUTH1 currently fails with RFAL ERR_PROTO (0xB) — under investigation, see docs/plans/2026-04-20-nucleo-nfc10a1-port.md and bench-notes/. Excluded: x-cube-aliro.zip vendor archive, harness/.venv, build dirs, generated aliro_trust.h (contains private reader scalar), all PEMs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
98 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
98 lines
3.5 KiB
Python
"""Tests for the DeviceResponse builder used in the step-up phase."""
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import cbor2
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import pytest
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
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from aliro_harness.issuer.access_document import build_access_document
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from aliro_harness.issuer.cose import verify_cose_sign1
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from aliro_harness.issuer.device_response import build_device_response
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@pytest.fixture
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def issuer_key():
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return ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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@pytest.fixture
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def access_doc(issuer_key):
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return build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1()).public_key(),
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)
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def test_device_response_has_aliro_remapped_top_level_keys(access_doc):
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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assert set(decoded.keys()) == {"1", "2", "3"}, (
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"top-level keys must be Aliro Table 8-22 aliases (version, documents, status)"
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)
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def test_device_response_version_is_1_0(access_doc):
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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assert decoded["1"] == "1.0"
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def test_device_response_status_is_ok(access_doc):
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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assert decoded["3"] == 0
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def test_device_response_has_exactly_one_document(access_doc):
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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assert isinstance(decoded["2"], list)
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assert len(decoded["2"]) == 1
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def test_document_doctype_is_aliro_a(access_doc):
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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assert decoded["2"][0]["5"] == "aliro-a"
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def test_issuer_signed_has_empty_namespaces(access_doc):
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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issuer_signed = decoded["2"][0]["1"]
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assert issuer_signed["1"] == {}, "v1 returns no Access Data Elements"
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def test_issuer_auth_is_the_original_cose_sign1(access_doc, issuer_key):
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"""IssuerAuth embedded in DeviceResponse must still verify as a valid
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COSE_Sign1 under the issuer's public key — i.e. the AD bytes round-trip."""
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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issuer_auth = decoded["2"][0]["1"]["2"]
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assert isinstance(issuer_auth, list) and len(issuer_auth) == 4, (
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"IssuerAuth is a 4-element COSE_Sign1 array"
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)
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# Re-serialize and verify.
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reserialized = cbor2.dumps(issuer_auth, canonical=True)
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payload = verify_cose_sign1(reserialized, issuer_key.public_key())
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assert isinstance(payload, bytes) and len(payload) > 0
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def test_forbidden_fields_absent(access_doc):
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"""Per Aliro §8.4.2, documentErrors / errors / deviceSigned / readerAuth
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SHALL NOT be present."""
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decoded = cbor2.loads(build_device_response(access_doc))
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doc = decoded["2"][0]
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assert "documentErrors" not in decoded
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assert "errors" not in decoded
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assert "documentErrors" not in doc
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assert "errors" not in doc
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assert "deviceSigned" not in doc
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def test_device_response_is_deterministic(access_doc):
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"""Same inputs must produce byte-identical CBOR."""
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a = build_device_response(access_doc)
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b = build_device_response(access_doc)
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assert a == b, "DeviceResponse must be deterministic CBOR for a given AD"
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def test_device_response_fits_within_realistic_apdu_budget(access_doc):
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"""Sanity-check that encrypted response size stays under the step-up
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APDU chain budget (ENVELOPE/GET RESPONSE supports >2000 bytes with
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extended-length support, but we want to stay comfortably small)."""
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encoded = build_device_response(access_doc)
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assert len(encoded) < 2000, f"DeviceResponse is {len(encoded)} bytes"
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