Three components, all bench-validated to varying depths: - applet/: CSA Aliro v1.0 Java Card applet for J3R180. AUTH0 + AUTH1 expedited-standard flow end-to-end green via PC/SC bench reader (aliro-bench-test). Userland AES-256-GCM and HMAC-SHA-256 layered on top of J3R180's primitives because the card lacks both natively. P-256 curve params seeded explicitly per J3R180's quirk. - harness/: Python orchestrator (aliro-trustgen, aliro-personalize, aliro-bench-test) for trust-bundle generation, card personalization via PersonalizationApplet, and PC/SC AUTH0+AUTH1 transactions. 126 pytest cases passing. - reader/STM32CubeExpansion_ALIRO_V1_0_0/: ST X-CUBE-ALIRO V1.0.0 with our NFC10A1 port (NUCLEO-U545RE-Q + X-NUCLEO-NFC10A1, ST25R200 shared with NFC09A1). nfc10-only/ project, NFC10A1 BSP shim, ALIRO_TRUST_OVERRIDE include into vendor's provisioning.c, and an ALIRO_APDU_TRACE wrapper around demoTransceiveBlocking. Boots, detects the J3R180, completes SELECT + AUTH0; AUTH1 currently fails with RFAL ERR_PROTO (0xB) — under investigation, see docs/plans/2026-04-20-nucleo-nfc10a1-port.md and bench-notes/. Excluded: x-cube-aliro.zip vendor archive, harness/.venv, build dirs, generated aliro_trust.h (contains private reader scalar), all PEMs. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.7 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
162 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
162 lines
5.6 KiB
Python
"""Tests for building minimal Aliro Access Documents.
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v1 scope: MSO contains only the fields needed for a Reader to verify the
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Access Credential public key. No Access Data Elements, no schedules, no
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access rules. Those arrive later.
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Reference: Aliro spec \u00a77.2 and ISO 18013-5 \u00a79.1.2.
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"""
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import cbor2
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import pytest
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from cryptography.hazmat.primitives.asymmetric import ec
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from aliro_harness.issuer.access_document import (
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ALIRO_DOCTYPE_ACCESS,
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MSO_KEY_DEVICE_KEY_INFO,
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MSO_KEY_DIGEST_ALG,
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MSO_KEY_DOC_TYPE,
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MSO_KEY_TIME_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED,
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MSO_KEY_VALIDITY_INFO,
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MSO_KEY_VALUE_DIGESTS,
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MSO_KEY_VERSION,
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build_access_document,
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)
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from aliro_harness.issuer.cose import verify_cose_sign1
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from aliro_harness.issuer.kid import compute_issuer_kid
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@pytest.fixture
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def issuer_key():
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return ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1())
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@pytest.fixture
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def access_credential_pub():
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return ec.generate_private_key(ec.SECP256R1()).public_key()
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def test_access_document_verifies_with_issuer_public_key(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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payload = verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key())
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assert isinstance(payload, bytes)
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assert len(payload) > 0
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def test_access_document_payload_is_canonical_cbor_map(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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payload = verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key())
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mso = cbor2.loads(payload)
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assert isinstance(mso, dict)
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def test_access_document_mso_has_required_aliro_keys(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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mso = cbor2.loads(verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key()))
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required = {
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MSO_KEY_VERSION,
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MSO_KEY_DIGEST_ALG,
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MSO_KEY_VALUE_DIGESTS,
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MSO_KEY_DEVICE_KEY_INFO,
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MSO_KEY_DOC_TYPE,
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MSO_KEY_VALIDITY_INFO,
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MSO_KEY_TIME_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED,
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}
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assert required.issubset(mso.keys()), f"missing: {required - mso.keys()}"
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def test_access_document_keys_are_text_strings_not_ints(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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"""Aliro \u00a77.2.2: keys replaced by integers 'still encoded as text strings'."""
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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mso = cbor2.loads(verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key()))
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for key in mso:
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assert isinstance(key, str), f"MSO key {key!r} must be tstr, got {type(key).__name__}"
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def test_access_document_docType_is_aliro_a(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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mso = cbor2.loads(verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key()))
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assert mso[MSO_KEY_DOC_TYPE] == ALIRO_DOCTYPE_ACCESS == "aliro-a"
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def test_access_document_digest_alg_is_sha256(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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mso = cbor2.loads(verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key()))
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assert mso[MSO_KEY_DIGEST_ALG] == "SHA-256"
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def test_access_document_time_verification_required_is_false_for_v1(
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issuer_key, access_credential_pub
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):
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"""v1 test CA emits permissive documents; Reader may ignore time checks."""
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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mso = cbor2.loads(verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key()))
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assert mso[MSO_KEY_TIME_VERIFICATION_REQUIRED] is False
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def test_access_document_device_key_is_access_credential_pubkey(
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issuer_key, access_credential_pub
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):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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mso = cbor2.loads(verify_cose_sign1(doc, issuer_key.public_key()))
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device_key_info = mso[MSO_KEY_DEVICE_KEY_INFO]
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cose_key = device_key_info["1"]
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assert cose_key[1] == 2 # kty = EC2
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assert cose_key[-1] == 1 # crv = P-256
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expected = access_credential_pub.public_numbers()
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assert cose_key[-2] == expected.x.to_bytes(32, "big")
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assert cose_key[-3] == expected.y.to_bytes(32, "big")
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def test_access_document_fits_within_applet_storage_budget(issuer_key, access_credential_pub):
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"""The applet's CredentialStore reserves ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN = 1024 bytes
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for the Access Document. If this test ever fails, either the AD has
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grown (add fields? new namespaces?) or the card-side budget needs a
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bump — sync with CredentialStore.ACCESS_DOC_MAX_LEN on the applet side.
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"""
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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assert len(doc) <= 1024, f"Access Document is {len(doc)} bytes, exceeds 1024-byte applet budget"
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def test_access_document_kid_in_unprotected_header_matches_issuer(
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issuer_key, access_credential_pub
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):
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doc = build_access_document(
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issuer_private_key=issuer_key,
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access_credential_public_key=access_credential_pub,
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)
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decoded = cbor2.loads(doc)
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_protected, unprotected, _payload, _sig = decoded
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assert unprotected[4] == compute_issuer_kid(issuer_key.public_key())
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