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nPA: fixed resume PIN command

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PACE with CAN followed by PACE with PIN in SM failed, because the
eac_ctx holding the SM context was always cleared at the beginning of
the second PACE run.
This commit is contained in:
Frank Morgner
2012-12-08 20:50:07 +01:00
parent c58aed6896
commit 758fe2b99f
1 changed files with 23 additions and 22 deletions
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45
virtualsmartcard/src/vpicc/virtualsmartcard/cards/nPA.py
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@@ -172,9 +172,6 @@ class nPA_SE(Security_Environment):
if tlv_data != []:
raise SwError(SW["WARN_NOINFO63"])
self.__eac_abort()
self.eac_ctx = pace.EAC_CTX_new()
if self.at.keyref_is_mrz():
self.sec = pace.PACE_SEC_new(self.sam.mrz, pace.PACE_MRZ)
elif self.at.keyref_is_can():
@@ -198,29 +195,33 @@ class nPA_SE(Security_Environment):
else:
raise SwError(SW["ERR_INCORRECTPARAMETERS"])
ef_card_access = self.mf.select('fid', 0x011c)
ef_card_access_data = ef_card_access.data
pace.EAC_CTX_init_ef_cardaccess(ef_card_access_data, self.eac_ctx)
ef_card_security = self.mf.select('fid', 0x011d)
ef_card_security_data = ef_card_security.data
ca_pubkey = pace.CA_get_pubkey(self.eac_ctx, ef_card_security_data)
pace.EAC_CTX_init_ca(self.eac_ctx, 0, 0, self.ca_key, ca_pubkey)
if not self.eac_ctx:
self.eac_ctx = pace.EAC_CTX_new()
if not self.ca_key:
# we don't have a good CA key, so we simply generate an ephemeral one
comp_pubkey = pace.TA_STEP3_generate_ephemeral_key(self.eac_ctx)
pubkey = pace.CA_STEP2_get_eph_pubkey(self.eac_ctx)
if not comp_pubkey or not pubkey:
pace.print_ossl_err()
raise SwError(SW["WARN_NOINFO63"])
ef_card_access = self.mf.select('fid', 0x011c)
ef_card_access_data = ef_card_access.data
pace.EAC_CTX_init_ef_cardaccess(ef_card_access_data, self.eac_ctx)
# save public key in EF.CardSecurity (and invalidate the signature)
# FIXME this only works for the default EF.CardSecurity.
# Better use an ASN.1 parser to do this manipulation
ef_card_security = self.mf.select('fid', 0x011d)
ef_card_security_data = ef_card_security.data
ef_card_security_data = ef_card_security_data[:61+4+239+2+1] + pubkey + ef_card_security_data[61+4+239+2+1+len(pubkey):]
ef_card_security.data = ef_card_security_data
ca_pubkey = pace.CA_get_pubkey(self.eac_ctx, ef_card_security_data)
pace.EAC_CTX_init_ca(self.eac_ctx, 0, 0, self.ca_key, ca_pubkey)
if not self.ca_key:
# we don't have a good CA key, so we simply generate an ephemeral one
comp_pubkey = pace.TA_STEP3_generate_ephemeral_key(self.eac_ctx)
pubkey = pace.CA_STEP2_get_eph_pubkey(self.eac_ctx)
if not comp_pubkey or not pubkey:
pace.print_ossl_err()
raise SwError(SW["WARN_NOINFO63"])
# save public key in EF.CardSecurity (and invalidate the signature)
# FIXME this only works for the default EF.CardSecurity.
# Better use an ASN.1 parser to do this manipulation
ef_card_security = self.mf.select('fid', 0x011d)
ef_card_security_data = ef_card_security.data
ef_card_security_data = ef_card_security_data[:61+4+239+2+1] + pubkey + ef_card_security_data[61+4+239+2+1+len(pubkey):]
ef_card_security.data = ef_card_security_data
nonce = pace.PACE_STEP1_enc_nonce(self.eac_ctx, self.sec)